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The Insurance Debacle of 1956: Why Depositors
Cheered for Albert Benton Shoemake’s Attempted Suicide
By A lexander J. D odd
1956 was expected to be a year of general prosperity in the
state of Texas.1A five-year drought, the longest of Texas’ history to
that point, lasted from 1950-1955, ended and allowed businesses
to move forward toward economic stability.2 The Texas Almanac
of 1955-1956 claimed that, even during the drought, Texas had
“years of record attainment in building, industrial employment,
merchandise sales and general commercial activity.”3 Texas ap
peared to benefit from the emerging prosperity and the hard work
of Texans through the drought. However, one key event showed
how businesses, specifically Texas insurance agencies, were less
secure than what was reported in the news or listed in the Alma
nac and how this impacted the perceived dependability of these
companies promoted in local advertisements. This research exam
ines the suicide attempt of Albert Benton Shoemake, President of
the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co., which broke new ground in the
developing foundation of insurance dealings in East Texas. Share
holders and families relying on Texas insurance worried about
trust, loyalty, and dependability. The fall of Shoemake’s companies
exposed crooked administrative practices and his suicide attempt
brought it into the spotlight. To understand how this case affected
Texas insurance companies, and the people who invested in them,
this research will include primary accounts from sources such as
Huntsville and Walker County records, the Houston Chronicle, the
Huntsville Item, and the Austin Statesman. This research begins
with an article published in the Huntsville Item in 1956.
Alexander J. Dodd is a graduate student at Sam Houston State
University
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Local newspapers in 1956 were loaded with advertisements
from local banks and insurance agencies promising dependability
and an obligation to ethical practice. These, of course, were written
on the horizon of what would be the second largest insurance disas
ter in all of Texas history. On January 5, 1956, the Item published
an article entitled “Progress in 1955.”4 This short article sets the
stage for local Huntsville banks and their eventual fight against the
distrust of the people toward big business. The article states that
the year of 1956 promises growth after a long drought in 1955.
Walker County relied on each person to use their opportunities to
“make Huntsville the golden spot of East Texas and the nearby
Gulf Coast area.”5 This advertisement sought to promote together
ness among the people, then introduce their services into the midst
of this feel-good promise. The article ends with a simple statement
referring to Texas business: “We can make it whatever we want
it to be- come what may!”6 In fact, located in the article directly
below was another short titled: “State Capitol News.”7 The arti
cle reports Drew Pearson’s proposed involvement with U.S. Trust
and Guaranty Co., how the Senate began hearings investigating the
company, other insurance companies owned by Shoemake were set
under investigation, and land suits were filed with talk of insurance
manipulations. The end of the article promises a great year for big
business in Texas. Though they exerted great effort, scandal was
coming to a head in East Texas.
On June 24, 1955, the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. was put
under a temporary restraining order after refusing to disclose its
failure to keep proper accounts, falsifying accounts, and from un
authorized investments made by the company to the general pub
lic.8 The state insurance commission issued the restraining order
and the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. faced a receivership hearing
in Austin.9 Shoemake attempted to recruit members of the state
senate, with two successful hires: They were Carlos Ashley and
Jep Fuller.10Those who accepted and worked for the U.S. Trust and
Guaranty Co. were under suspicion due to the recent allegations
connected to their business dealings with Shoemake. Ashley acted
on Shoemake’s behalf as his attorney and Fuller also provided help
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to Shoemake through his law firm and represented Shoemake’s
company in several individual cases.11 The hiring of senators was
no accident. Shoemake surrounded himself with prominent actors
with political prowess to act as a buffer between himself and prying
investigators.
State senators gathered an investigation committee and named
State Auditor, C.H. Cavness to keep records of the U.S. Trust and
Guaranty Co. and all its affiliates.12 Cavness was asked to prepare
a summary of expenditures of the company for 1954 and 1955 and
include legal fees, public relations and advertising expenditures,
and the names of persons to whom they were paid.13 Shoemake’s
companies had already shown signs of corruption prior to the
charges. Renne Allred, an attorney for the receiver of Texas Insol
vent Insurance Company,14 charged the investigating committee;
claiming that the company evidenced insolvency earlier in 1955.15
While Allred’s statement is true, the combination of other suspi
cious companies under Shoemake’s authority and the 128,000 in
vestors effected by his company’s insolvency created a dire need to
retrieve money.16 Attorney General John Ben Shepperd estimated
that investors would only receive around 15 cents for every dollar
invested.17 McLennan County District Attorney, Tom Moore, stated
that a grand jury would be empaneled in Waco on January, but was
unsure whether they would hear the case against the U.S. Trust and
Guaranty Co.18
Other insurance companies with relationships to Shoemake’s
U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. were also under investigation by the
Insurance Commission.19 These companies were ordered to show
cause to prove why their licenses should not be revoked.20 These
insurance companies included the All American Home Lloyds,
the U.S. Life Insurance Co., Southern Medical and Hospital Ser
vices of Waco, and American Atlas Life Insurance Co. of Dallas.21
The All American Home Lloyds company was shut down after it
was proven insolvent, owing around $235,217.00.22 Some insur
ance companies, such as the U.S. Life Insurance Co. and Southern
Medical and Hospital Services of Waco, were affiliated with other
companies: the U.S. Trust and Dallas Fire and Casualty Co.23 The
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entanglement of these companies would prove fatal for the con
tinuation of the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. Six other firms be
longing to Shoemake were in danger of becoming insolvent. While
these companies were being investigated, Shoemake was under
close watch as the head of all six companies.
Shoemake’s home was searched during a raid led by Byron
Lockhart, the attorney for the liquidation division of the Texas in
surance commission.24 The search was ordered by District Judge
Charles O. Betts, who earlier shut down the 11 firms of the U.S.
Trust and Guaranty Co. in Texas.25 Shoemake claimed that he had
stashed unaccounted company funds in the amount of $98,942.67
into his account.26 An article in the Austin Statesman claims that
Shoemake “co-operated in full with the surprise inventory.”27 Even
if the money was recovered, it would be nothing compared to the
supposed $7,000,000 lost by Shoemake’s company.28
In Waco, January 7, 1956, A.B. Shoemake attempted suicide
using a .380 Colt automatic.29 Shoemake was discovered by his
neighbor, Joseph W. Barnes, in his home covered in blood.30 Barnes
was called by Mrs. Shoemake after Mr. Shoemake missed a previ
ously planned dinner date with Mrs. Hoffman, Mrs. Shoemake’s
sister.31 Barnes went to the side door calling out for his friend,
when Shoemake opened the door, bloody and incoherent.32 Barnes
rushed him to the bathroom to get him cleaned up, then returned
to the phone where Mrs. Shoemake was still awaiting news about
her husband.33 Barnes told her to come quickly and contacted Dr.
Boyd Alexander, the Shoemake’s family physician to the scene.34
Dr. Boyd put bandages on Mr. Shoemake as Mrs. Shoemake con
tacted an ambulance.35 When the ambulance arrived, they found
Shoemake badly wounded with blood already leaking through both
sides of the bandages and sitting slumped in a chair in the side
room of his home.36
Shoemake was rushed to Hillcrest Memorial Hospital, where
he was provided glucose, plasma, and other treatments to offset
potential shock.37 Dr. Alexander reported to The Austin Ameri
can, that “He will probably live until Sunday morning.”38 Dr. Au
brey Goodman, quite optimistically claimed, “He may live, but
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I wouldn’t write any life insurance on it.”39 Things looked bleak
for Shoemake in the wake of his suicide attempt. On Monday of
the following week, Shoemake was declared a dying man, with no
hope for survival.40 He was given approximately 15 hours to live.41
Shoemake’s suicide attempt created another problem. His life was
insured through two policies in the amount of $1,000,000.42 In the
event of Shoemake’s death, the beneficiary of the insurance poli
cy was the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co., which was in temporary
receivership.43 The creditors, therefore, would be the recipients of
his life insurance money in accordance with what they were due.
According to a Houston Chronicle article, some life insurance poli
cies are voided in the event of a suicide.44 However, in Shoemake’s
case, with his policy it was difficult to determine whether they
would be voided or not.45 The deciding factor rested with Shoe
make and his survival.
The fraudulent nature of Shoemake’s business dealings baffled
government officials such as State Dist. Judge Charles O. Betts,
who said that it was “the most amazing, fraudulent thing it has ever
been my misfortune to look at.”46 Others surely agreed with Judge
Betts’ opinion. A meeting of depositors from seven cities flocked
to San Jacinto high school, where they were planning to discuss a
statewide organization.47 Ironically, the news of Shoemake’s hospi
talization was revealed to investors in Shoemake’s own company,
who displayed a mixed reaction of groans, clapping, and cheers.48
State Senator, Jimmy Phillips, commented on the ordeal, saying
“anyone who would try to use your misfortune as a political ve
hicle would in my mind be as guilty of callous indifference to the
people’s welfare as those who are responsible for this situation.”49
However, Phillips himself used the opportunity to promise the in
vestors a secure repayment of their funds as he campaigned for
governorship.50 He told them that his number one objective was to
“regain all or part of their life savings.”51
The Texas Insurance Commission was experiencing its own
difficulties amid the debacle sparked by Shoemake. Ralph Yarbor
ough, an Austin attorney and gubernatorial candidate, during the
same meeting of depositors, called for the resignation of all three
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members of the Texas Insurance Commission.52 The commission
was under criticism for holding closed sessions. Senator Searcy
Bracewell of Houston, was replaced by Senator William S. Fly,
after Bracewell quit in protest of those closed sessions.53 Renne
Allred made a series of charges against the commission for bribery
and graft, for which he claimed he could provide evidence.54 He
also accused them of negligence. Similarly, Yarborough claimed
that the insurance commission delayed in acting against the U.S.
Trust and Guaranty Co. that the commission demonstrated a “friv
olous conception of its responsibilities.”55 The structure of the in
surance commission was changing. Yarborough said that “They’ve
just turned the horses around and hitched them up again with their
tails toward the front and their heads up against the dashboard.”56
An ineffective commission boded fruitless consequences in the
case against the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.
The situation was exacerbated further when a group of credi
tors from Waco boycotted a meeting held by depositors who sought
to replace the previous Texas insurance commission.57 The boycott
was in response to what attorney John L. Bates called a “meeting of
political speakers.”58 The resultant legal resolution was a statewide
audit of all Texas insurance companies. To prevent collusion, no
auditor was assigned to check a company of former employment or
one in which they owned stock. There was also a second resolution
that objected to state legislators from being employed by insurance
companies and objected to members of the State Insurance Com
mission accepting favors or taking trips provided by various insur
ance companies. These resolutions were a step in the right direc
tion. However, it was discovered, or claimed, that the commission
was not fully supportive of their own resolutions. Instead, their
resolutions were acting as appeasements and used to rally support
under their seemingly strong enforcement of ethical practice.
The $7,000,000 debt that was claimed against the U.S. Trust
and Guaranty Co. was also in dispute, as John L. Bates reported in
an article in The Houston Chronicle,59 Bates stated that he coordi
nated a detailed investigation into the firm’s financial history. He
said that the total loss of the firm should not amount to more than
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$1,200,000, and possibly much less than that. Bates also claimed
that he would seek a declaratory statement, giving the depositors
of the firm preferred treatment from the state receiver. Depositors
organized themselves as the Preferred Depositors Assn, of Texas
to enforce their entitlement to first preference on the assets of the
U.S. Trust & Guaranty Co. and that an attorney and auditor will
be hired as necessary to see that all such assets “be marshaled for
our benefit.”60 The organization of these depositors created a new
body of individuals who could now coordinate distribution of as
sets through the receiver-liquidator and enforcement of criminal
and civil pursuits. The Preferred Depositors Association of Texas
formed when the Texas Insurance Commission failed to coordinate
and perform their duties responsibly. Yarborough’s comment, that
“The commission for some time has not merited the confidence of
the people of Texas or the insurance industry of the state,” was part
of the feeling and motivational force that led to the development of
this new organization.61
Governor Allan Shivers, who was present at the meeting of
depositors, said that the creditors did not need to organize and that
the state receiver and the courts could handle the insurance situa
tion without interference. He also claimed that certain politicians
were using this problem to their own advantage to gain votes. An
Austin American Statesman article adds, “He made it clear indi
rectly, that he was referring to Yarborough.”62 It is important to
note that, in 1956, governor Shivers had already been a large part
of the economic backbone in Texas for seven years prior.63 Before
being elected governor, Shivers ran and was elected as lieutenant
governor in 1946. In the Texas Politics Project, he is remembered
as having “helped bring Texas into the twentieth century.”64 After
becoming governor in 1949, Shivers replaced long-time partner
and former governor Beauford H. Jester, who died on July 11 of
that same year. Shivers acted quickly, establishing the Legislative
Council and the Legislative Budget Board. During the last years of
his governorship, Shivers’ popularity began to decline. His politi
cal standing on Eisenhower and his opposition to Brown v. Board
o f Education were responsible for his loss of popularity in the eyes
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of Texans. What really ended his career as a politician was the cor
ruption of his administration “because of state scandals involving
insurance and veterans’ lands.”65 Shiver’s push for his own admin
istration to take control of the insurance scandals removes doubt of
this accusation. His deference to Yarborough also shows how his
fear bubbled up, that the scandals were not new; but were a result
of a preeminent system of corruption.
Ralph Yarborough was a political activist who became pop
ular among voters in Texas in the 50s.66 Yarborough was elected
to the United States Senate in 1957. Shivers retired from politics
in 1957.67 The state was not only going through a small insurance
scandal, but was also experiencing an important turn from conser
vative to liberal and what became known as “Yarborough-Democrats.” Yarborough’s “grass-roots” ability to stimulate people and
rally voters is a large part of what gave his campaign for reform of
the insurance commission its value. State Representative Tom Jo
seph of Waco reminds us not to become carried away in the words
of Yarborough; The meeting “may be a political football for others
but not for me. I’m sticking to the cold facts.”68 At this point, there
was no way to be certain who was guilty, and for what crime. A
necessity for answers kept the investigation going.
Opinions soon began to come up from the investigation. Tom
Moore, District Attorney of Waco, believed that Shoemake was
solely responsible for the fiasco associated with the U.S. Trust and
Guaranty Co.69 He said, “It is my opinion now that the whole thing
was a one-man operation.”70 Reports from the auditor showed that
several insurance companies were going into receivership because
of their failure to cooperate and release their records.71 The possi
bility of finding evidence for the corruption of Shoemake’s compa
ny was slim, especially considering what is known about governor
Shivers and the corruption of his administration.
The incestuous interrelationships between various companies
created a scenario of panic and mistrust. For example, Shoemake’s
home was mortgaged with the title held by another one of his com
panies: the U.S. Automotive Services.72 There is evidence which
suggests that Shoemake played the lead role in the fraudulent
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practices of his firms. An article from The Austin Statesman says
that witnesses in the past month, during various investigations of
Shoemake’s firms, “had testified that Shoemake ruled the firm with
an iron hand,” and that “he was the only person who knew the intri
cate operations that were carried out. ” 73 No other person, except for
Shoemake, knew how the companies operated according to witness
es and demonstrated by the lack of knowledge on the part of the Tex
as Insurance Commission. The answers laid in a new hospital bed.
Shoemake was transferred from Hillcrest Memorial Hospital
in Waco to a veterans administration hospital because he had no
money to pay his medical bills . 74 He was showing signs of increas
ing health. Dr. Boyd Alexander, Shoemake’s family physician from
Waco, said that Shoemake was in good shape and able to recognize
his wife, swallow food and water, and nod his head to answer ques
tions . 75 Investigators waited anxiously for Shoemake’s recovery.
With Shoemake’s unique knowledge of his company’s processes he
could provide information privy only to himself. The State Senate
and House investigating committees used new tactics while they
waited eagerly for the recovery of Shoemake.
A large investigation conducted by the Senate and House in
vestigating committees was set out to check functions of the Insur
ance Commission, study circumstances surrounding operation and
collapse of the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co., determine if remedial
legislation is needed, and investigate lobbying practices.76 All four
of these items are discussed in this research. The information gath
ered by later articles in newspapers such as the Huntsville Item,
show how chaotic the situation became through increased specula
tion in preparation for the findings of the official investigation. The
first sentence of an article titled “State Capitol News”, describes
accusations and their denials about details regarding the operation
of the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. and other organizations. Talk of
scandals involving politicians became evermore pronounced and
public. The previous situation in which Shoemake offered certain
political figures employment now seemed a small ordeal compared
to the accusations being thrown about in the month following
Shoemake’s attempted suicide.
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Again, the Insurance Commission received criticism when
Renne Allred claimed that the commission received evidence of
fraudulent activity from a report regarding the U.S. Trust and Guar
anty Co.77 Though Allred is correct,78 it may not be fair to criticize
the commission in this way and assume that they were completely
aware of fraud. However, it is also reported that the U.S. Trust and
Guaranty Co. “operated without a license from May 31, 1955, until
put into receivership Dec. 12.”79 Even this statement is subject to
debate because, according to Paul Connor, an attorney for the In
surance Commission, all licenses for insurance companies expire
on May 31 and companies are allowed to continue for a time un
til they acquire a new license.80 The Insurance Commission began
to work on new policies which would require Texas companies to
prove their solvency by May 31 or lose their licenses, and require
insurance companies to publish financial reports.81 The House and
Senate committee chairmen expressed their eagerness to question
Shoemake, as the political realm offered no true insight into the
real dealings of the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.82
Two auditors were selected to conduct independent audits of
the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.83 The two men were Felix Einsohn
and Charles K. Leslie. Einsohn was a certified public account from
Dallas and Leslie was an independent consulting actuary. The two
auditors would investigate the firm to return lost investments to
their respective investors. One such company, the Fidelity Trust
and Guaranty Co. of Temple, collected more than $1,000,000 in au
tomobile notes from the defunct U.S. Automotive Service, another
company run under the authority of Shoemake.84 The companies
affiliated with Shoemake’s U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. were al
ready suspected of fraudulent activity. The problem facing inves
tigators was how they were involved and what happened with the
reported $1,000,000 owed by the defunct insurance company.
Even without Shoemake’s testimony, investigators began to
piece together traces of suspicious activity between Shoemake’s
companies and other actors. Shoemake’s heavy handed manage
rial tendencies would catch up with him when Leslie, one of the
auditors assigned to independently audit the U.S. Trust and Guar-

135

EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOURNAL
anty Co., reported to the Senate investigating committee about his
time spent under the employment of Shoemake as an accountant.85
Shoemake’s insurance company, Campbell Builders Corporation,
would later become the U.S. Automotive Service. Shoemake re
tained Leslie in 1954 to assemble data for this company to per
suade the Board of Insurance Commissioners of his legal practices.
The report was successful, and Leslie was retained once again by
Shoemake to process similar data for Shoemake’s Southern Guar
anty Co. and the transfer of funds from it to the Campbell Builders
Co. Leslie’s data and the companies seemed on par with the legal
practices required of them. Leslie’s job would become more dif
ficult, however, after being retained once again by Shoemake for
records regarding the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.
The U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. was created out of a merg
er between Shoemake’s U.S. Trust Company and his U.S. Trust
and Guaranty.86 When retained by Shoemake in 1954, Leslie found
that the records were “so inadequate that he withdrew.”87 Leslie
claimed that the figures would have to be guesses, and that Shoe
make would naturally be the best one to guess them.88 Inadequate
records, seven different companies, and transferring funds between
them was a recipe for disaster for Shoemake’s insurance empire.
Leslie was the chief examiner of the Board of Commissioners in
1954 and, upon seeing the inadequacy of Shoemake’s records and
other companies, determined that the “whole setup” of Shoemake’s
companies be examined, with property appraisals and new valua
tions to make up for Shoemake’s own lack of data. So, from 1954
to the end of 1955, these companies continued to work within their
poorly structured system and eventually rack up an immense debt
and lead a man to attempt suicide. It was revealed in Leslie’s re
ports that Shoemake was not simply transferring money, but he
was “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” as Leslie pictured it. Leslie found
three loans from the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. to Campbell
Builders Co. which were paid to fraudulently display a company
in full solvency.
Another development came about in early February regarding
the official records of Shoemake’s U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.
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Shoemake sent a confirmed 11 letters to Garland A. Smith, the
former chairman of the Texas Board of Insurance Commissioners.
Smith resigned after acquiring a stomach illness and was unable to
provide the information. The investigation revealed that these let
ters showed the weekly deposits and withdrawals of U.S. Trust and
Guaranty Co. from Sept. 30 to Dec. 9, 1955.89 There were several
documents missing, but from those provided an interesting pattern
emerged and a new understanding of the case came about. Auditors
testified that the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. was making consid
erable profit from sales of certificates. Shoemake had not obtained
a permit to sell certificates after the Securities Regulation Act, and
the letters indicate that Smith was aware of the situation. Smith
would later make an appearance in court before the McLennan
County grand jury to testify against Shoemake and provide neces
sary information about the case.
Arrangements were attempted to repay the people who had lost
money by investing with the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co., as well
as some of its other affiliates, which were all connected to Shoe
make. A petition was filed by Representative Bert McDaniel of
Waco, and former U.S. Trust attorney, to place priority of liquida
tion of U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. payments on draft holders. The
amount owed to the 5,600 draft holders was around $5,800,000.90
If the petition went through, the draft holders would get their mon
ey back. However, as has been shown, other organizations felt that
priority of payments should be made to them in full. This could
not possibly work with so many difficulties and the vast number of
people negatively affected by Shoemake’s companies. The realities
investigators faced in the liquidation of owed monies to clients
of the former organizations included “unorthodox bookkeeping,
annual statements, bolstered by borrowing, blown-up real estate
values, and minutes of board meeting never held.”91 These factors
made it seem impossible to pay full funds to all parties.
The liquidation process, set in motion by the Fidelity Trust and
Guaranty Co., was headed by J.D. Wheeler.92 Wheeler claimed that
first payments to U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. creditors could be
expected about mid-July. New chairman for the Insurance Corn-
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mission, J. Byron Saunders, reported that the insurance problem
was not completely resolved, but was on its way. The Insurance
Commission would begin 4 initiatives to “clean-up” what was
left of the debacle.93 These initiatives included: leave of absences
granted to four examiners suspected of fraud, an order to certain
insurance agencies to show cause lest their licenses be revoked,
cut rates for insured crops, and announcing that all advertising of
insurance securities be approved by the commission before they
are published. Along with this, Saunders said that insurance com
panies that passed a solvency test and get licenses after May 31 are
“entitled to public confidence.”94
Almost one year later, on February 17, 1957, it was reported
in the Austin American Statesman, that about $2,000,000 was now
available to be paid to creditors who had lost money with the de
mise of Shoemake’s company.95 Byron Lockhart, attorney for the
receiver-liquidator, stated that liquidation of the assets was still in
progress. The people were going to receive their money. In 1957,
Shoemake continued to make slow progress at a veteran’s hospital
in Waco, where he was transferred due to his inability to pay his
hospital bill.96 It was reported by doctors that Shoemake was like a
child. The gunshot wound to his head went through the part of his
brain normally associated with lobotomies. Shoemake continued to
receive medical treatment, but doctors made it clear that he would
never fully recover from this wound. His motor skills were mak
ing progress. The most significant part of Shoemake’s condition
was his memory. Shoemake could no longer remember anything
in clarity.
Initially, after he shot himself a year before, he could recall
people and things, but he could not put together items into a context
which made sense. He was reported to have been using a wheel
chair and answering questions in short answers. He continued to
outlive the expectations of doctors. Shoemake should not have
survived to see January 8, 1956. His progress was so great that,
in 1957, Shoemake was described by doctors to have the mental
age of an 8-year-old.97 Full recovery was an impossibility accord
ing to doctors at the veteran’s hospital. The progress of Shoemake,
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especially considering the injury, was nothing short of a miracle.
Between 1956 and 1957, Shoemake’s progress caused Dr. Buckholts to deem him capable of discharge, so long as Shoemake had
a caretaker to receive him from the hospital. Unfortunately, for
both Shoemake and his wife, Mrs. Shoemake became ill and was
unable to receive Shoemake under her care. Dr. Buckholts was un
able to provide Shoemake with a caretaker, so it was determined
that Shoemake would stay at the hospital indefinitely.
Though sick and still recovering, Shoemake was not free of
the consequences awaiting him for his actions before the attempted
suicide. He was indicted in Waco on two counts of selling certified
drafts without obtaining a permit from the state insurance board.98
Tom Moore Jr., District Attorney, said that arraignment would be
gin as soon as possible for Mr. Shoemake.99 Shoemake’s attorney,
Representative Bert McDaniel, was planning to make an insani
ty plea on behalf o f Mr. Shoemake.100 McDaniel included that he
would seek Shoemake’s commitment to the State Hospital for the
Insane at Austin.101
Shoemake was never brought to trial.102 The receivership of the
U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. was formally closed June 6, 1963 by
District Judge Charles O. Betts. Liquidation to people with claims
against the company received only 40.31 cents on the dollar of
their money back from their investments.103 The mortgage on the
Shoemake home was not considered a homestead because it was
mortgaged under the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.104 The mortgage
was in the name of Shoemake’s brother-in-law, and was ready to
be admitted as an asset in the liquidation process until Mrs. Shoe
make filed a suit claiming that it was there homestead and could
not be mortgaged. The case ended in a settlement. H.W. Hoffman,
the brother-in-law whose name was on the mortgage, let the home
fall into ruin.105 The Shoemake guest house caught fire in 1969.
Weeds were growing all around the home.
As for the ongoing case, six other people were indicted who
were suspected of fraudulent activities connected with Shoe
make.106 They were Willis V. Lewis, Hugh Hope, James M. May,
Willis E. Hutchearider, Marshall A. Fuglaar Sr., and Sylvester

139

EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOURNAL
Loughlin. Their arraignment was expected in early September.
Several charges were brought against them. All included years
in prison and thousands of dollars in fines. Just as Shoemake had
hired Leslie to present his company’s accounts, Shoemake also re
tained several senators throughout 1955.107 These senators did not
run again but were not indicted on charges either. The fall of Shoemake’s company resulted in the second largest liquidation process
in Texas state history.108
In 1955, it was claimed that 1956 would be a year for prog
ress. Indeed, it was a year that saw exceptional progress in multiple
arenas of Texas life; economically, socially, and politically. Or, at
least, that’s how it was portrayed in various news articles and me
dia. Different articles and different papers all reported conflicting
numbers at some point. The $7,000,000 for example, was claimed
by some to be only $1,000,000. By others it was claimed to be
$2,000,000. There was no general factual consensus on numbers or
exact details of Shoemake’s case. The memory of the fall of Shoemake’s empire is, in the public sphere, nonexistent. In the political
sphere it is an example of a man who failed at building a successful
business. General prosperity was the implied sentiment, but con
sidering the tragic destruction of a man’s companies, even under
the shroud of a fraudulent mind, must show that there was more to
1956 than a blissful general prosperity. In this instance, we see a
man, whose last conscious words included: “the only thing I have
done wrong is to try to build a business.”109 Shoemake’s attempted
suicide exposed the public to the faulty administrative practices of
insurance agencies in their time. In the end, it was Shoemake who
had the bullet crash through his head, and others accused of fraud,
or overlooked, who were paid or fired. Shoemake died at a veterans
administration hospital, where he was kept for over 15 years after
shooting himself.110 He died on April 30, 1972 at the age of 77 from
heart complications. He is buried in San Saba Cemetery.
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